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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 1982, the United States Supreme Court rendered
an opinion against the City of Boulder, Colorado, which expanded
the potential liability of local governmental entities and their offi-
cials to claims under the federal antitrust laws.' The Supreme
Court essentially held that a municipality cannot obtain immunity
from antitrust claims unless it satisfies a stringent test. Due to the
broad language of the opinion, virtually every activity in which a
local governmental entity engages, including the traditional activi-
ties of zoning, licensing, franchising, purchasing and operating
public utilities, has become subject to antitrust challenges that
may require a trial on the merits.
In the wake of this decision, several municipal law experts pre-
dict that a wide range of local government activities will be ex-
amined for antitrust problems and warn local goverments to brace
themselves for an onslaught of antitrust lawsuits. Others warn that
the ruling effectively destroys the "home rule" movement in this
country, will interfere severely with local government efforts to
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1. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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govern and provide services, and will reconcentrate power at the
state level.
2
This decision has come at an unfortunate time. The economic
slow-down has caused budget problems for local governments and
has forced them to seek new methods of purchasing and new
sources of revenue. The likelihood of legal challenges by affected
companies has increased while, at the same time, the Supreme
Court has limited the use of traditional protective shields. More-
over, the states, which normally could be expected to cooperate
with local governments, view the recent developments as an oppor-
tunity to increase their power and revenue at the expense of local
governments. For example, twenty-three states, including Colo-
rado, joined as amicus curiae in asking the Court to deny antitrust
immunity to the City of Boulder.'
Recognizing the concern and uncertainty that the recent Su-
preme Court decision has created, this article attempts to analyze
the meaning of this decision for local governments. It will summa-
rize the legal standards applied in this area, discuss the types of
local activities that may be affected, and suggest guidelines for re-
ducing the risk of both being sued for a violation of the antitrust
laws and suffering an adverse verdict.
II. THE PURPOSES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The basic purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote and pro-
tect vigorous, free and open competition in the marketplace. The
antitrust laws are based on a Congressional belief that such compe-
tition provides the strongest guarantee that the American con-
sumer will obtain the best product at the lowest price,4 and more
courts are accepting this as the principal antitrust goal.5
There are four broad antitrust statutes: the Sherman Act,' the
2. Herbers, Cities Fear Court Ruling May Bring Flood Of Suits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1982, at 1, col. 1; Ranii, Cities' Immunity Loss Spawning Antitrust Suits?, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
1, 1982, at 8, col. 3. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at
845, 850-851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3. 102 S. Ct. at 851 n.7. The states that joined as amicus curiae were Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
4. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 50-66 (1978).
5. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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Clayton Act,7 the Robinson-Patman Act,8 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.9 The federal antitrust laws were enacted under
the power to regulate commerce and, therefore, apply only if inter-
state or foreign commerce is affected.1"
IEI. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, was the first modem federal
antitrust statute and continues to be the most important.1" Section
1 declares illegal all contracts, combinations or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade or commerce. It reaches all agreements, arrange-
ments or understandings, whether written, oral or implied, be-
tween two or more persons, usually competitors, which
unreasonably restrain trade.12
Courts have determined that business practices which involve
collusive action between competitors, customers or suppliers are
clearly unreasonable restraints of trade and, therefore, are classi-
fied as "per se" violations of the antitrust laws.' 3 Per se violations
include agreements to fix prices, 4 agreements with competitors to
limit the production of goods or competition in product quality, 5
agreements with competitors to divide markets by territory or class
of customers,' boycotts or concerted refusals to deal with competi-
tors,"' agreements fixing or directly affecting resale prices, 8 and
tying arrangements which condition the sale of one product on the
customer's agreement to purchase another product.' 9
Courts have found that other business transactions and practices
are not so pernicious as to be treated as "per se" illegal, but these
7. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976 & Supp. H 1978 & Supp. IV 1980); 29 U.S.C. § 52-53 (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 13-13b, 21a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
12. Id. at § 1.
13. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
14. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-24 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
15. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 (1945); United States v.
American Standard, Inc., Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,549 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
16. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
17. IKor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
18. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960).
19. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99
(1969).
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activities may violate the Sherman Act if they unreasonably re-
strain trade or damage competition. Non-per se conduct is tested
by the "rule of reason" which requires careful examination and
weighing of all the circumstances surrounding the challenged con-
duct.20 The judicial inquiry focuses on the nature and effect of the
restraint, the condition of the market before and after the restraint
was imposed, the object the defendant is attempting to achieve,
the reason for adopting the particular restraint, and the existence
of less destructive ways of achieving the defendant's legitimate
goals.21 The antitrust considerations involved in these transactions
and practices can be extremely complex, and the business practices
that are measured by the "rule of reason" include vertical agree-
ments which restrict a person's right to sell to a particular geo-
graphic area or a particular class of customers,22 reciprocal dealing
arrangements, 23 agreements requiring a person to purchase all of
his requirements of a given product from another person,24 exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, 25 and unfair or deceptive methods of
competition.26 Section. 2 of the Sherman Act covers unilateral busi-
ness activity and prohibits the monopolization or attempted mo-
nopolization of a market for a particular product or service.2
While the Sherman Act applies to restraints of trade which have
a present anticompetitive effect, the Clayton Act renders unlawful
practices which may result in an unreasonable restraint of trade in
the future. The Clayton Act prohibits the sale or lease of products
on the condition that the customer not deal in competitive prod-
ucts, tying the sale of one good to another, and certain mergers and
acquisitions, any one of which may substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly.
28
20. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
21. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See P. Areeda, The
"Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
22. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
23. Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th
Cir. 1971).
24. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 324 (1961).
25. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); American Motor Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 560-62 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury
Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978 & Supp. IV 1980).
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The Robinson-Patman Act reaches the discriminatory pricing of
goods among competing non-governmental buyers.29 The Federal
Trade Commission Act authorizes the Federal Trade Commission
to enforce the federal antitrust laws and prohibits "unfair methods
of competition" and "deceptive practices." 30 However, the latter
two statutes have little applicability to local governmental activi-
ties and therefore are not discussed in this article. With these basic
principles in mind, an examination of the potential liability of local
governmental entities and their officials under the antitrust laws
follows.
IV. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The City of Boulder Decision
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court recognized that al-
though Congress expressed a preference for using competition to
regulate private businesses, states may substitute regulation for
competition and impose anticompetitive restraints as an act of
government.3 1 Parker v. Brown involved a Sherman Act challenge
to a California agricultural marketing program established by state
statute which expressly restricted competition among raisin grow-
ers and fixed the prices at which growers could sell their products.
The purpose of the statute was to conserve California's agricultural
wealth and prevent economic waste in marketing the state's agri-
cultural goods. 2
The Supreme Court assumed that the program would violate the
Sherman Act if it had been the product of a private agreement.83
In upholding the statute and thereby establishing the "state ac-
tion" exemption to the Sherman Act, the Court emphasized that
the program had been established by state legislation and-was ad-
ministered by a state commission appointed by the governor and
approved by the state senate. The commission approved agricul-
29. 15 U.S.C. § 13-13b, 21a (1976). It is doubtful that the Robinson-Patman Act applies
to sales to states, state agencies, municipalities or federal agencies. Sachs v. Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 234 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956); F. RowE, Pmcz DISCRIMATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT 83-85 (1962). See also, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck
Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Ky.), affd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 780 (1942).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
31. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
32. Id. at 346.
33. Id. at 350.
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tural policies following public hearings. In essence, the state cre-
ated the machinery for the state program and enforced it through
the commission." Since the program "derived its authority . . .
from the legislative command of the state"35 and was administered
in detail by the state itself, the Court concluded that the Sherman
Act did not apply. The Court explained that the Sherman Act
was directed at "individual and not state action" and was not in-
tended to nullify state governmental action.
3 7
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers
or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system
of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sov-
ereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress. 8
The Court was not presented with the question "of the state or its
municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or
combination by others for restraint of trade."3' 9
The Supreme Court did not discuss the application of state ac-
tion immunity to local governments until thirty-five years later in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.40 In that case,
two cities which owned and operated electric utility systems sued a
private utility company. The utility counterclaimed against one
city, asserting that its requirement that customers purchase elec-
tricity from it as a condition to receiving water and gas service vio-
lated the Sherman Act. The city claimed exemption under the
state action doctrine because it was a political subdivision of the
state. The Supreme Court rejected the city's defense and held that
local governmental entities are not automatically exempt from an-
titrust liability simply because they are subdivisions of the state. 1
The members of the Court could not agree on a majority opinion
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id. at 350.
36. Id. at 352.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 350-51.
39. Id. at 351-52.
40. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
41. Id. at 408.
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and City of Lafayette did not establish a clear standard for deter-
mining local government immunity. The four-Justice plurality ar-
gued that we are a nation of states under our federalism principles
and that "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign.... 42 As a result,
they concluded, cities are exempt from antitrust liability only
when their anticompetitive actions are "directed or authorized"
and supervised by the state as part of its "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" policy to substitute regulation or monop-
oly for competition. 3 Although Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the decision, his reasoning was entirely different. He distinguished
between "the proprietary enterprises of municipalities" and their
"traditional government functions" and stated that the state ac-
tion exemption should not apply when cities are engaged in busi-
ness activities." Several subsequent cases attempted to follow and
give meaning to the City of Lafayette holding, but they spawned
differing versions of the proper test for state action immunity and
confused, rather than clarified, the applicable legal standard.45
The Supreme Court's January, 1982, opinion in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,4 dispelled some of the
confusion, but did so at the cost of establishing a strict test for
local government exemption from antitrust claims. In effect, the
Supreme Court declared that competition is the preferred, rather
than an alternative, economic model and required that all exemp-
tions be strictly construed.
The case arose from Boulder's regulation of cable television ser-
vices to its residents. Boulder had franchised Community Commu-
nications Company ("CCC") to provide cable television service to
the Boulder area for several. years. CCC limited its service to re-
transmitting television signals to portions of the city shielded from
normal service by surrounding hills. After industry technology im-
proved, CCC notified Boulder that it intended to increase its offer-
ing and expand its business into other areas of the city. Another
42. Id. at 412.
43. Id. at 410, 414.
44. Id. at 422-24.
45. E.g., Shrader v. Horton, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,146 (W.D. Va. 1979) (emphasis
on governmental versus proprietary nature of activity); Caribe Trailer Sys., Inc. v. Puerto
Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,576, 77,317-77, 318 (D.D.C.
1979) (compulsion by state not required); Jordon v. Mills, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 62,704
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (immunity granted although City of Layfayette standards were not met
because regulation of prisons is a primary governmental function).
46. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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cable television company also expressed an interest in providing
cable service in the city. Because of its concerns that a cable com-
pany has a tendency to become a natural monopoly and that CCC
might not be the best cable operator for the city, Boulder en-
couraged applications from other companies. Since expansion by
CCC would hamper the ability of other companies to compete and
discourage them from entering the market, the city council passed
an ordinance prohibiting CCC from expanding into other areas of
the city for three months. The city council announced that it in-
tended to invite new businesses to enter the market during this
moratorium. 7
CCC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Boulder from
restricting its expansion, alleging that such a restriction violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Boulder claimed that its ordinance
was immune from antitrust liability -under the state action
doctrine.48
The Supreme Court rejected Boulder's argument in a five to
three decision and held that "home rule" ordinances are not ex-
empt from antitrust scrutiny. 49 Since a city is not a sovereign en-
tity within our dual system of federal government, it can qualify
for and obtain state action immunity only to a limited extent. The
Court established the following standard for determining whether
local government activity comes within the state action exemption:
a city ordinance is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny "unless it
constitutes the action of the State. . .itself in its sovereign capac-
ity . . . or unless it constitutes municipal action in furtherance or
implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy .... -50 The state policy referred to consists of the
47. Id. at 837-38.
48. Id. at 838.
49. The District Court had determined that the state action exemption under Parker v.
Brown was "wholly inapplicable" to Boulder's ordinance. 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D. Colo.
1980). A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of exemption under Parker v. Brown was
"wholly inapplicable" to Boulder's ordinance. 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D. Colo. 1980). A
divided panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that, in con-
trast to City of Lafayette, no proprietary interest of the city was involved, and that the
city's regulation was the only control exercised by state or local government and represented
the only expression of policy on this matter. Thus, it held that Boulder's actions satisfied
the criteria for the Parker v. Brown state action exemption. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision. 102 S. Ct. at 839.
50. 102 S. Ct. at 841. The requirement that the state policy to replace competition with
regulation be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" had been established in prior
Supreme Court decisions. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410; New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
[Vol. 16:705
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state's intention "to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly public service." 51
With regard to the first element of the test, Boulder contended
that the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the broad "home rule"
powers granted to cities by the Colorado constitution, which con-
ferred on the cities every power in local affairs previously pos-
sessed by the state legislature. Therefore, the city claimed that it
was acting as the state in local matters and the ordinance was an
act of state government. The Supreme Court easily disposed of this
argument by declaring that "[w]e are a nation not of 'city-states'
but of States" and municipalities "are not themselves sovereign. '52
The Parker state action exemption reflects Congress' intention to
embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States
possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.
But this principle contains its own limitation: Ours is a "dual sys-
tem of government," . . which has no place for sovereign cities.5 s
[citation omitted]
The Supreme Court then focused on the second element of its
state action immunity test. Boulder asserted that it may be in-
ferred from the "home rule" authority given by the Colorado con-
stitution that the state legislature contemplated the kind of an-
ticompetitive regulatory program objected to by CCC. The Court,
however, found that the city's general grant of "home rule" power
to act in local matters and enact ordinances did not satisfy the
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" re-
quirement because the state was merely allowing the city to do as
it pleased and did not contemplate or authorize the specific an-
ticompetitive ordinance. Although the city had broad authority,
the position of Colorado's legislature was neutral regarding the
particular municipal action taken.54
But plainly the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative
expression" is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere
neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticom-
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The Court expressly adopted the requirement in
City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 841.
51. 102 S. Ct. at 840 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
at 413).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 841-42 (quoting 630 F.2d at 717 and 435 U.S. at 412-13).
53. 102 S. Ct. at 842.
54. Id. at 842-43.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
petitive. A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please
can hardly be said to have "contemplated" the specific anticompeti-
tive actions for which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those
actions be truly described as "comprehended within the powers
granted," since the term, "granted," necessarily implies an affirma-
tive addressing of the subject by the State. The State did not do so
here: The relationship of the State of Colorado to Boulder's morato-
rium ordinance is one of precise neutrality. . . . "We are here con-
cerned with City action in the absence of any regulation whatever by
the State of Colorado. Under these circumstances there is no inter-
action of state and local regulation. We have only the action or exer-
cise of authority by the City. '55
The Supreme Court summarized its decision by stating that
when the "State itself has not directed or authorized an anticom-
petitive practice, the State's subdivision . . . must obey the anti-
trust laws."'5' Thus, the basic lesson of City of Boulder is that local
governments are not immune from antitrust liability unless their
actions are specifically authorized by the state or are in further-
ance of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
General grants of power by the state to local governments to con-
duct local affairs are not sufficient.
B. The Future
The language of the City of Boulder opinion is broad and sweep-
ing, covering virtually every aspect of local government activity,
but leaving the exact parameters of the antitrust liability of local
governments unestablished and key questions unanswered. Subse-
quent decisions are needed to clarify the antitrust exposure of local
governments. Unfortunately, local governments will bear the bur-
den and expense, through litigation, of defining the limits of their
authority under the antitrust laws. The remaining sections of this
article address the unresolved issues, the most recent applications
of the City of Boulder decision, the areas of local government ac-
tivity that already have been challenged and recommendations for
minimizing potential antitrust exposure.
C. Unanswered Questions
The City of Boulder decision left open several questions that
55. Id. at 843 (quoting 630 F.2d at 704, 707).
56. 102 S. Ct. at 843-44 (quoting 435 U.S. at 416).
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must be answered before the boundaries of a local government's
antitrust liability can properly be defined. First, it is unclear
whether a state must actively supervise a local government's activi-
ties in order for state action immunity to be available. In Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,5"
which involved a challenge to a state statute setting resale prices
for all wine producers and wholesalers within the state, the Su-
preme Court stated that the state action exemption is available
only where the local activity is (a) "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy" and (b) "actively supervised by
the State itself."' 8 Both standards must be satisfied, and the chal-
lenged program was denied immunity because it did not satisfy the
second element, even though it met the first.59
City of Boulder creates confusion about the proper standard for
state action immunity because it did not track the Midcal lan-
guage and only considered compliance with the first prong of the
Midcal test. Since Boulder's ordinance did not satisfy the "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" criterion, the
Court did "not reach the question whether the ordinance must or
could satisfy the 'active state supervision' test focused upon in
Midcal."8 0 As a result, it is not clear that local government activity
must be actively supervised by the state in order to be immune. If
active state supervision is required, the burden on local govern-
ments to establish the exemption will be greater, and fewer local
activities will be able to avoid a trial. This uncertainty can only be
resolved by future decisions. Since it may be several years before
there is a definitive answer to this question, local governments
must be conscious of and attempt to satisfy the active state super-
vision criterion wherever feasible. Specific recommendations re-
garding this matter are discussed below.
The second unanswered question is whether a viable "public in-
terest" defense exists for local government conduct that does not
qualify for state action immunity. If allowed, this defense would
protect local government actions in which the public health, safety
and welfare purpose and benefits outweigh the anticompetitive ef-
fects. Although such a defense is not permitted in suits against pri-
vate parties, a footnote in City of Boulder suggested a possible ex-
57. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
58. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting 435 U.S. at 410).
59. 102 S. Ct. at 841.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14 (emphasis added).
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ception for local governments: "As we said in City of Lafayette,
'[i]t may be that certain activities, which might appear anticompe-
titive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different com-
plexion when adopted by a local government.' "'1 Additionally,
Justice Stevens stated in his concurring opinion that there is an
"obvious difference between a charge that public officials have vio-
lated the Sherman Act and a charge that private parties have done
SO.
' 62
While the Supreme Court has not described the different stan-
dards that might be applied in an analysis of local government
conduct under the antitrust laws, courts may be inclined to bal-
ance the governmental purpose and public benefits against the an-
ticompetitive effects. Several pre-City of Boulder decisions focused
upon the public interest fostered by the challenged regulation in
evaluating local government activity under the antitrust laws. For
example, in Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City,
Iowa,"5 plaintiffs tried to exclude the testimony of city council
members concerning the public interest they were trying to ad-
vance on the ground that it was irrelevant to the city's antitrust
liability. The Court held that the governmental reasons and objec-
tives of the city council members were relevant and admitted the
testimony.
On the other hand, there is authority for the proposition that
good motives are not a valid defense to an antitrust claim. In Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,6 the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, in litigation involving pri-
vate parties, that price competition between professional engineers
produces inferior engineering work endangering the public safety.
Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to the impact of the chal-
lenged conduct on competitive conditions and struck down the ban
on price competition among professional engineers e5
61. Id. at 843 n.20.
62. Id. at 844. Additional support for the proposition that local governments can raise a
public interest defense is contained in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 n.24
(1976), where Justice Stevens, joined by three justices, noted that there is a difference be-
tween official and individual action.
63. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,566 (8th Cir. 1982); see Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City
of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1023 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
64. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
65. Id. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476,
485 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is not the function of a group of professionals to decide that com-
petition is not beneficial in their line of work, we are not inclined to condone anticompeti-
tive conduct upon an incantation of 'good medical practice.' ").
[Vol. 16:705
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While this reasoning possibly could be applied to the conduct of
local governments, it is more likely that courts will fashion a public
interest defense which relieves municipal action of antitrust liabil-
ity even though the action is not entitled to immunity. Courts
would then admit and rely upon testimony from local officials con-
cerning the public interest objectives and reasons for their actions.
Moreover, local governments have traditionally regulated and con-
ducted local affairs, and courts have been quite reluctant to review
the merits and reasonableness of local regulations. The courts
probably will continue to sustain local government action that is
undertaken in good faith to further legitimate public health, safety
or welfare interests. Nevertheless, although a defense based on up-
holding justifiable and reasonable exercises of local authority will
reduce the exposure of local governments to damage awards, it will
not directly reduce the expenses of trial because any defense is a
factual matter that must be established at trial.
The last unanswered question concerns the nature of the penal-
ties that can be imposed against local governments and officials.66
Lower federal courts have offered some guidance in this area. Mu-
nicipalities can be subject to injunctions, which enjoin them from
continuing their anticompetitive activities.67 They may also be held
liable for treble damages, which are calculated by multiplying the
plaintiffs' actual loss by three, plus reimbursement of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fees and costs6 8 The prevailing rule is that a court
has no discretion to limit an antitrust award only to actual dam-
ages, and this rule is applicable when local governments are defen-
dants.69 Claims against local governments and officials can easily
reach millions of dollars.
Public officials can be held individually liable for antitrust viola-
tions if their conduct is outside the scope of their official authority
and responsibility. For example, individual liability has been im-
66. The Supreme Court did not decide what remedies are appropriate against municipal
officials in City of Boulder. 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20.
67. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
68. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
69. Id. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in City of Boulder, quoted and adopted Justice
Blackmun's dissent of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442-
43 (1978) in the following "[i]t will take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics to con-
clude that municipalities are not subject to treble damages to compensate any person 'in-
jured in his business or property. .. ."' 102 S. Ct. at 848 n.2. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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posed on local government officials who actively participated in an-
ticompetitive agreements with private parties and who used their
positions to promote their own interests and economic benefit.70
Finally, criminal penalties of imprisonment and fines are possi-
ble for antitrust violations.71 However, the United States Attorney
General realistically can be expected to initiate a criminal prosecu-
tion against local governments or their officials only in extreme
cases.
7 2
D. Recent Applications of the City of Boulder Decision
Since the City of Boulder opinion was issued, several cases have
been decided which illustrate the difficulty local governments will
have in demonstrating that particular actions were taken to imple-
ment the state's clearly articulated policy of supplanting competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service."
A prime example is Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,74
which involved an agreement by a city, county and state water au-
thority to develop a solid waste recycling plant. The agreement
provided that the city would construct and operate the plant and
70. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981);
Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980).
71. The penalties for criminal violations of the antitrust laws are quite severe. A violation
of the Sherman Act is a felony for which a corporation, and presumably a local governmen-
tal entity, can be fined up to $1,000,000 for each offense. An individual who authorizes or
participates in a violation of the Act is also guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of up to
$100,000 and a sentence of up to three years in prison for each offense. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(1976).
72. In his remarks before the National League of Cities on Apr. 30, 1982, Abbott B. Lip-
sky, the Deputy Assistant to the United States Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stated
that the City of Boulder decision does not raise the threat of criminal liability for local
government officials except in extraordinary circumstances. See Supplementary Material,
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Filing No. 541, at 8 (May 10, 1982). Similarly, in a June 30, 1982
hearing before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Antitrust Division, William F. Baxter, stated that criminal indictments
would not be brought against municipal officials when the legality of their conduct is uncer-
tain or the conduct is openly undertaken without any intention to violate the law. Supple-
mentary Material, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Filing No. 549, at 6 (July 6, 1982).
73. The recent decision in Phillips v. Crothers, 1982-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 64667 (D. Or.
Feb. 12, 1982), is not very helpful in analyzing the impact of City of Boulder. Phillips in-
volved an antitrust suit brought against the medical director of the state workers' compen-
sation department for advising insurance companies in advance not to authorize injured
workers to go to the plaintiff's chiropractic clinic. It is not instructive because the court did
not refer to the City of Boulder decision, but rather focused on whether the defendant's
conduct was "compelled" by state statutes and regulations.
74. 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and judgment vacated for further consid-
eration in light of City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982).
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the county would dispose all of its solid waste at the plant. The
state water authority's involvement was limited to regulating the
types of materials handled by the plant. In order to guarantee a
supply of solid waste for the plant, the city enacted an ordinance
to establish a monopoly over local garbage collection and disposal
practices. The ordinance prohibited the establishment of alterna-
tive waste disposal sites and required all garbage collectors to de-
posit all waste at the city's plant. The city was acting under its
"home rule" powers granted by the Ohio constitution and specific
state statutes which gave municipalities the authority to regulate
garbage disposal.7 Several waste collectors and landfill operators
sought injunctive relief against the city, alleging that its actions
violated the federal antitrust laws by eliminating competition in
the waste disposal industry. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the injunction.
The court reasoned that the Sherman Act did not apply to this
situation because garbage collection and disposal are activities
which are traditionally reserved to states and local governments,
and the "home rule" provisions of the state constitution authorize
the city to regulate garbage collection. The court further stated
that the city's plenary governmental power to deal with local
problems should not be preempted or displaced by the federal an-
titrust laws.76 Therefore, it held that the city was exempt from the
Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the decision and re-
manded the case to the appellate court for reconsideration in light
of City of Boulder.7 Since the state statutes authorizing the city's
regulation of garbage collection and disposal are broad and permis-
sive in nature, it will be difficult to show a clearly articulated state
policy to establish municipal monopolies over garbage collection
and disposal, although participation of the state water authority
will help. If the city's actions are not immune, the issue will be
submitted to the finder of fact for determination on the merits.
Another application of City of Boulder is Mason City Center
Associates v. City of Mason City,7 8 where a city and the individual
75. 654 F.2d at 1189-91.
76. Id. at 1195-96.
77. 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982).
78. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), a/t'd, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,566, 73,100
n.5 (8th Cir. 1982). The District Court rejected the defendant's state action defense before
City of Boulder was decided, but the Court of Appeals stated that the District Court's deci-
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city council members were sued under federal antitrust law for de-
nying an application for a zoning change. The city had adopted a
comprehensive plan for regulating land uses in the city. The plan
stressed the development of a compact central business district
and avoidance of regional shopping centers on the edges of the
city. The city later entered into an agreement with two developers
for the development of a regional shopping center in the central
business district. It further agreed to discourage any development
contrary to the objectives of the comprehensive plan's downtown
development proposal.79
The plaintiffs decided to construct a regional shopping center on
the edge of the city and filed an application to rezone the property
from agricultural to commercial use. When the city council denied
the rezoning application, plaintiffs sued the city, the members of
the city council and the developers for conspiring to exclude a
competing shopping center in violation of the Sherman Act. Defen-
dants claimed that their actions in refusing to rezone the property
were exempt from the antitrust laws. 0
The court rejected the state action immunity defense because
the state zoing laws did not direct or contemplate that municipali-
ties enter into anticompetitive agreements with private developers
in connection with the exercise of their zoning powers. Although
the zoning statutes had some anticompetitive effects, they did not
reflect a clear and affirmative intent by the state to displace com-
petition with regulation or monopoly public service. The state stat-
utes merely empowered municipalities to set up zoning mecha-
nisms and did not require them to make zoning decisions for the
purpose of excluding or limiting competition."1 Furthermore, since
the zoning laws were totally neutral on municipalities' entering
into anticompetitive agreements with private developers as part of
their zoning activities, there was no basis for finding that the state
contemplated such action. The court also noted that the city could
have exercised its zoning powers adequately and effectively with-
out entering into anticompetitive agreements with private par-
ties. 2 In sum, the major obstacles to granting immunity to the de-
fendants were that the zoning laws did not clearly reflect the
sion was consistent with the City of Boulder ruling.
79. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,566, 73,097-73,098.
80. Id.
81. 468 F. Supp. at 742-43.
82. Id. at 743.
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state's intent to substitute regulation for competition and that the
city entered into an anticompetitive agreement with private
parties.
On the other hand, the City of Boulder test was satisfied in
Pueblo Aircraft Services, Inc. v. City of Pueblo.83 The City of
Pueblo operated a municipal airport and leased portions of the air-
port property to "fixed base operators", who conducted business
and performed services at the airport. The lease agreements ex-
pressly required the operators to purchase all of their aviation fuel
from the city. One of the operators was unsuccessful in bidding to
extend the terms of its lease and subsequently filed an antitrust
action against the city challenging its requirement that all aviation
fuel be purchased from it.
8 4
The Tenth Circuit held that the city's operation of a municipal
airport was exempt from the antitrust laws under the first part of
the City of Boulder test. The decision was based on a state statute
that specifically authorized the city to operate a municipal airport
and stated that such operations are "hereby declared to be public,
governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose and matters
of public necessity. ... 5 In view of this affirmative legislative ac-
tion, the court found that the city was entrusted with some of the
powers of the state for the public good and actually was acting as
"an arm of the state." It was operating the municipal airport as a
governmental, rather than proprietary, function on behalf of the
state, and the benefits of its operation flowed to the general public
and were not just for the particular advantage of the city's re-
sidents."6 Thus, the city's operation of the municipal airport quali-
fied for state action immunity under the City of Boulder standards
because it constituted the action of the state itself.8 7 Moreover, the
court noted that in the absence of such express statutory direction,
the operation of a municipal airport generally is regarded as a pro-
prietary rather than a governmental function.88 Interestingly, the
court applied a general immunity test to the municipal airport and
did not attempt to determine whether the aviation fuel-tying ar-
83. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,668 (10th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 73,628-29.
85. Id. at 73,630 (quoting COLO. Rv. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973)).
86. Id. at 73,631-32.
87. Id. This decision dealt only with the first element of the City of Boulder test and did
not consider whether the city's action was undertaken pursuant to a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy."
88. Id. at 73,632.
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rangement was specifically authorized as state policy.
These recent cases reflect the stricter standards imposed on local
governments after the City of Boulder decision. They indicate that
unless local governments are acting as the state itself or pursuant
to a specific legislative directive, it will be difficult to satisfy the
requirement of "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy."89
V. LOCAL ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY CHALLENGED UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
During the past several years, local governmental entities and
officials have been subjected to an increasing number of lawsuits
challenging their activities on antitrust grounds. The lawsuits
cover a wide variety of local government activities, including some
of the traditional, established functions of local governments. 0
89. A number of cases also are pending in which the actions of local governments have
been challenged under the antitrust laws. For example, private hotel developers have sued
the City of Richmond, Virginia, the city council, the planning commission, the Richmond
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, and others for blocking construction of a competing
hotel in one area of the city, while allowing another hotel to be built in a declining area that
the city wanted to protect and develop. Richmond Hilton Assoc. v. City of Richmond, No.
81-1100-R (E.D. Va., filed Dec. 23, 1981). Hopefully, this case and others will further define
the legal standards governing antitrust immunity for municipalities and suggest ways in
which municipalities can avail themselves of that immunity.
90. For example, local governments and their officials have been sued under the antitrust
laws for zoning decisions, see Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
64,029 (D. Colo. 1980); Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp.
737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,566 (8th Cir. 1982); regulating
solid waste collection and disposal, see Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F.
Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979), affirmed sub nom., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654
F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and judgment vacated for further consideration in
light of City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982); controlling the installation of electrical
distribution and outdoor lighting systems, see Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util.
Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981); prohibiting competition with municipal water and
sewer services, see Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1981) (immunity granted); Shrader v. Horton, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 63,146 (W.D. Va.
1979) (immunity granted); awarding cable television service franchises, see 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981); ad-
ding new requirements to public contract awards, see City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren,
Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,527 (N.D. Ga. 1981); awarding park concession licenses,
see Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of City of Lafayette, 453 U.S. 992, reinstated in per-
tinent part 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); regulating fixed
base operators at municipal airports, see Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F.
Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 64,668 (10th Cir. 1982) (immu-
nity granted); Guthrie v. Genesee Cty., New York, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. N.Y. 1980); Pine-
hurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979); awarding an
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Although local governments and their officials were granted im-
munity in some cases, several of the aforementioned decisions no
longer are valid under the standards established by City of Boul-
der.91 More importantly, the number of antitrust lawsuits filed
against local governments as well as the types of local activities
subjected to such lawsuits may increase in view of the broad ruling
in City of Boulder. The list of challenged activities undoubtedly
will grow in the years ahead due to the significant expansion in
local government antitrust liability, and the omission of an activity
from this list is no assurance of immunity.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING ANTITRUST EXPOSURE
The next important consideration concerns the steps local gov-
ernments can take to reduce the risk of being sued for a violation
of the antitrust laws. Despite the broad implications of City of
Boulder, some local government activities are not likely candidates
for antitrust actions for two reasons. First, there is either an af-
firmatively expressed state interest and policy sufficient to meet
the Supreme Court's test or, second, the activities are conducted in
an open, ministerial manner that does not adversely affect compe-
tition. A typical example of the latter is the purchase of items
through public solicitation of bids.
However, the publicity generated by City of Boulder has alerted
persons who deal with local governments to new antitrust reme-
dies, and the current economic recession has made businesses more
litigious when contracts or expectations are lost. Although this
should make local governments more cautious they need not be
airport taxicab monopoly, see Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); awarding a bus service contract, see Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229 (D.
Mass. 1980) (immunity granted); awarding a parking lot franchise, see Corey v. Look, 641
F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages, see Grendel's Den, Inc. v.
Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, reu'd on other grounds upon rehearing en banc, 662 F.2d 102 (1st
Cir. 1981), appeal filed sub nom., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3422 (Nov. 10,
1981); enforcing a deceptive trade practice ordinance, see Fugazy Continental Corp. v.
Midgley, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1164,537 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (immunity granted); preventing
a developer from participating in an urban housing and redevelopment plan, see Cedar-
Riverside Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 62,346 (D. Minn. 1978)
(immunity granted); and challenging development in a suburb of a city, see Miracle Mile
Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,735 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (immunity
granted).
91. For example, the following lower court decisions probably would not satisfy the City
of Boulder test if reexamined today- Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187
(6th Cir. 1981); Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D.
Colo. 1980).
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passive observers. Local governments can and should take several
affirmative steps to minimize their antitrust exposure and reduce
their risk of becoming involved in antitrust litigation.
A. Advise local government decision-makers of the antitrust law
requirements.
As an initial preventive measure, persons in policy-making and
managerial positions should be advised of the general prohibitions
and pitfalls of the applicable antitrust laws to increase their aware-
ness of and sensitivity to antitrust problems. Each local govern-
ment should circulate a written outline of the basic antitrust re-
quirements and prohibitions and consider conducting an
educational seminar for persons in policy and decision-making
positions.
B. Review the state statutes governing particular areas of local
activity.
The first step in actually analyzing the possible antitrust liability
of a local government is to examine the provisions of the state con-
stitution and the applicable state statutes controlling its operations
in specific areas. The areas in which the local government is acting
as an arm of the state or under a clearly articulated state policy to
replace competition with regulation should be identified. This will
enable the local government to concentrate on protecting activities
that are not immune. 92
C. Examine the local government's activities for potential anti-
trust problems.
Each local government should identify areas of particular anti-
trust concern. This can be done by examining the local govern-
ment's activities, and isolating areas which are likely to present an-
titrust problems and are not protected by open and objective
decision-making processes. An extremely careful review should be
made of the areas involving antagonistic economic interests, such
as zoning or franchising, and other areas which involve the expen-
diture of large sums of money or offer private parties large gains or
losses. Once these high risk areas are identified, local governments
should consider implementing the following possible alternatives
92. If City of Pueblo is followed, a general statute may protect anticompetitive
subordinate activities not specifically mandated by the state.
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for reducing antitrust exposure.
D. Seek protective legislation from the state legislature.
The surest method of avoiding antitrust liability is to obtain the
enactment of state legislation that clearly and affirmatively ex-
presses a state policy of replacing competition with regulation and
delegates to local governments responsibility to carry out that pol-
icy. The legislation should apply statewide, not just to a particular
locality, and it is not sufficient simply to authorize local govern-
ments to act anticompetitively. If the legislation does not com-
mand or direct a specific anticompetitive activity, it should ac-
knowledge the need for different policies in different areas and set
out detailed standards and procedures to define the situations in
which anticompetitive practices can be implemented.
While the legislation preferably should be limited to a speciific
area of local activity, it may be possible to obtain legislation that
attempts to exempt all local government activities from antitrust
liability. For example, a bill has been introduced in the Colorado
legislature which contains state recognition of the essential role of
local governments in accomplishing the public purposes of the
state and expressly directs local governments to displace competi-
tion with regulation.93 However, such broad legislation probably
will not succeed because it offers no clearly delineated standards.94
Proposed legislation also should attempt to comply with the ac-
tive state supervision standard. Sufficient state supervision of local
regulatory activity probably can be accomplished by providing for
the availability of review by a state board or commission, judicial
review in the state courts, the authority of the legislature to enact
and amend implementing regulations or the authority of the legis-
lature to establish local government advisory commissions.
There are limitations to this legislative approach. First, local
governments might object to operating under such detailed state
regulation. Second, where large expenditures or important issues
are involved, state governments may not be willing to delegate au-
thority to local governments or authorize anticompetitive conduct.
As previously stated, Colorado and twenty-two other state govern-
ments filed briefs with the United States Supreme Court opposing
93. Colo. H.B. 1258, 53d Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1982).
94. But see supra 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,668 and note 104.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Boulder's claim of home rule exemption. 5 It appears that state
governments saw this case as an opportunity to recoup state pow-
ers that were lost to home rule governments. Third, some activities
may require particularized treatment, and statewide regulations
and centralized policy-making may not be feasible.
E. Articulate the public interest objectives of local activities.
"Good motives" are not a direct defense to antitrust violations;
however, motives can be important in assessing the economic con-
sequences of local government conduct and the legality of that
conduct if it is challenged under a rule of reason analysis. As a
result, local governments should develop a written statement of the
public interest reasons and objectives for activities likely to be
challenged under the antitrust laws. If these reasons and objectives
are stated and followed, the local government should be able to
demonstrate that the regulation is motivated by good faith govern-
mental concerns and not anticompetitive concerns restricted by
the antitrust laws. For example, in Hybud Equipment Corp. v.
City of Akron,96 the City of Akron could have developed a written
record showing that its monopoly of solid waste collection was nec-
essary to support a solid waste disposal facility which had long-
term health and economic implications for the entire community.
F. Competition should be restricted only to the minimum extent
necessary.
Whenever competition in a particular area is to be regulated or
restricted, the local government should assess the anticompetitive
effects of the proposed action, determine whether restricting or
eliminating competition is really necessary and, if so, search for
alternative ways of accomplishing its goals that are less restrictive
of competition. Regulations should restrict competition only to the
minimum extent necessary to satisfy the stated public interest. 7
Local governments can reduce their antitrust exposure by being
sensitive to the anticompetitive effects of their actions and adopt-
ing the least restrictive anticompetitive act capable of accomplish-
95. See supra note 3.
96. 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and judgment vacated for further consid-
eration in light of City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982).
97. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 425-26 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Cantor, 428 U.S.
at 597 & n.37; Mason City Center Assocs., 468 F. Supp. at 743, affd, 1982-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,566 (8th Cir. 1982).
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ing their public purpose.
G. Establish objective criteria and procedures for decision-mak-
ing processes.
A court is more likely to defer to a local government's decision if
it believes the decision was reached in a procedurally fair and thor-
ough manner. Moreover, since plaintiffs are sometimes motivated
by a sense of having been treated unfairly, fair treatment both
reduces the risk of suit and the likelihood of an outraged jury.
Therefore, whenever possible, local governments should develop
and publish objective criteria and procedures for their various de-
cision-making processes. Especially in the high risk areas, critical
decisions should be based on established procedures and written
recommendations that weigh the alternatives and articulate the
public policy concern(s).
In awarding contracts or franchises, local governments should
use competitive bidding procedures if feasible. Particularly where
bids involve non-quantifiable factors, the initial decision of which
bid to accept should be made by a municipal employee who reports
to the governing council or board, rather than by the elected offi-
cials themselves. Employees who have met privately with the bid-
ding parties should be removed from the final decision-making
process. Where meetings with private parties are necessary, they
should not be conducted by the ultimate decision-maker. Rather,
the ultimate decision should be based on written reports by staff or
consultants and on comments by the interested parties.
When open bids are not possible, local governments should hold
public meetings or hearings to consider such actions as the grant-
ing of contracts or franchises and zoning decisions. Public meetings
or hearings also should be held whenever a local government is
considering regulatory or anticompetitive practices, and the meet-
ings should emphasize the public need for the proposed govern-
mental action. All affected parties should be given a fair and full
opportunity to be heard on these decisions.
Although private meetings are frequently necessary as sources of
information and understanding between government and business,
they are dangerous. Private meetings should be conducted care-
fully since many antitrust lawsuits allege conspiracies between the
local governments and private parties. Since Section 1 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act requires a contract, combination or conspiracy,
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unilateral acts are exempt. Therefore, all municipal actions should
be undertaken unilaterally, not pursuant to an agreement or un-
derstanding with private parties. Unilateral action is crucial be-
cause it defeats allegations of an illegal contract or conspiracy and
avoids judicial findings that the state legislature did not contem-
plate that its local governments would enter into anticompetitive
agreements with others in connection with the exercise of their
governmental powers.
When private meetings are necessary, the government represen-
tative making the private contacts should not be the decision-
maker, and in every case the final decision-making process should
be as separate from the private conference stage as possible. An
additional buffer could be created by having a consultant investi-
gate the matter and recommend actions to the decision-makers.
Finally, local officials must avoid even the appearance of impro-
priety relating to conflicts of interest by declining to participate in
matters that may affect their individual interest or benefit them
directly or indirectly. In sum, by adhering to fair, objective proce-
dures for their decison-making processes, local governments will
create fewer disgruntled parties and will reduce the likelihood of
being sued for violations of the antitrust laws. These precautions
also will reduce the risk of being charged with participating in con-
spiracies or deviating from established criteria or procedures to the
benefit of favored parties.
VII. CONCLUSION
City of Boulder significantly increased the potential antitrust li-
ability of local governments and their officials. This decision prob-
ably will lead to antitrust scrutiny of virtually every aspect of local
activity and an increase in legal challenges to those activities. Lo-
cal governments should prepare for the new challenges and legal
battles by educating their employees to antitrust principles, closely
examining the statutes that authorize them to act in certain areas
and evaluating specific activities for potential antitrust problems.
They also should consider protective legislation for high risk areas
and implement objective procedures to insure that decisions are
made fairly and for the purpose of protecting the public interest.
Furthermore, local government officials should limit private meet-
ings and communications with interested persons in order to de-
crease the chance of being charged with participating in a conspir-
acy or agreement with others.
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Although the antitrust exposure of local governments has in-
creased, the exact nature of that exposure as yet has not been
clearly defined. Additional court decisions are needed to clarify the
extent to which local governments will be held accountable under
the antitrust laws. By taking the steps outlined above, local gov-
ernments can help shape and define their antitrust destiny in a
more acceptable manner.

